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I. INTRODUCTION
In the time needed to read this article, the world’s wealthiest people will
have acquired more capital wealth with the earnings of capital (even as they
sleep) than most people will earn in their lifetimes, no matter how long, hard,
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Supreme Court. The author expresses his gratitude to the growing number of economists who have learned and
endorse the principles underlying his approach to a more inclusive capitalism.
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and smart they work. 1 To do so, the wealthiest 1% (along with other existing
corporate shareholders) are routinely aided in capital acquisition transactions by
the legislated corporate default advantages and the institutions of corporate
finance. This article explains how, without redistribution, publicly traded
business corporations may voluntarily choose to broaden their share ownership to
include poor and middle-class people, enhance the earning capacity of those
people, improve corporate profitability and share value, and lay the structural
economic foundation for sustainable growth.
Virtually all publicly traded corporations rely on the legislated corporate
default advantages that include: (1) perpetual existence, (2) centralized
management and control of revenues, (3) limited liability of investors and lenders
for corporate liabilities, and (4) stable legal entity status unaffected by changes in
share ownership. These characteristics work synergistically to make the default
corporate legal infrastructure the preferred means to amass great wealth in
virtually all capitalist economies. They equip corporations with super-human
powers that greatly enhance their ability to function competitively in the national
and world economies that evolved contemporaneously with the great rise in
productive capacity spawned by the industrial revolution. They have been highly
instrumental (if not essential) in the accumulation and concentration of vast
private wealth in the hands of relatively few individuals (generally less than 10%
of the population) and the exacerbation of unequal economic opportunity in
virtually every nation. 2 Although there are a growing number of newly emerging
multi-millionaires and multi-billionaires (including some instances of rags-toriches), they are statistically an insignificant representation of the experience of
the entire population.
A major effect of the present operation of the legislated default corporate
infrastructure is to increase the future distribution of the ownership of corporate
wealth roughly in proportion to the pre-existing ownership distribution of
corporate wealth. What is not so widely recognized is how corporations could
also use these attributes to increase and distribute much more corporate wealth
more broadly for the benefit of their shareholders, other stakeholders, and
society. Based on a more broadly shared understanding of the principles of
inclusive capitalism, 3 rather than serving primarily as wealth-concentrating
1. See Hillary Hoffower & Sahayanne Gal, How Much Money Billionaires and Celebrities Make Per
Hour, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-billionairescelebrities-make-per-hour-2018-8 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (estimating that some
billionaires make in excess of over a million dollars per hour).
2. See also JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 48 (1st ed.
1984) (quoting Louis D. Brandeis) (“We can have democracy in this country or we can have great wealth
concentrated in the hands of a few, but we cannot have both.”).
3. See generally Robert Ashford, Why Working but Poor? The Need for Inclusive Capitalism, 45 U.
AKRON L. REV. 507 (2016). My approach to a more inclusive capitalism is based on principles of corporate
finance and an understanding of economics, law, technology, and capitalism first advanced by Louis Kelso in
LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER
J. ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS: A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS
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institutions, such corporations may increasingly choose to become capital
ownership-broadening institutions.
The main determinant of the value of most publicly traded corporations is not
the profits they distribute to shareholders (relatively few regularly do so) but
rather their long run ability to generate “discretionary revenues” (revenues in
excess of obligatory operating costs, interest expenses, short term liabilities,
announced dividend policies, and taxes). At the discretion of corporate
management, protected by the business judgment rule, these revenues may be:
(1) appropriately used for research, development, capital maintenance and
acquisition, and other corporate wealth-enhancing expenditures, (2) held in cash,
(3) distributed to shareholders, and/or (4) misused and thereby reflected in
illegitimate agency costs. Competitively maintaining and enhancing long-term,
discretionary revenue-generating capacity requires at least maintaining and
preferably increasing market share vis a vis competitors. In an economic history
(like that of the USA) in which growth is the rule and recession is the exception
and in which advancing technology is a primary, if not the primary, cause of percapita growth, this discretionary revenue-generating capacity requires ongoing
annually administered real capital acquisition planning, which in turn requires
long-term corporate credit-worthiness, which in turn has usually been achieved
by optimizing corporate debt (consistent with the maintenance of a competitive
credit rating).
Presently through these corporations, almost all new capital is acquired with
the earnings of capital, and approximately 25% of it is acquired with borrowed
money. 4 Thus, by way of the default corporate legal infrastructure, operating
with the aid of a government-maintained monetary system, a highly regulated
credit system in an economy in which government is both the empire and a major
player, people wealthy enough to be substantial shareholders are accorded an
advantage that non-shareholders generally do not have: indirect access to nonrecourse corporate credit to acquire an increasing shareholder interest in 25+% of
the annual increase in corporate assets before the corporations whose shares they
own have generated the revenues used to pay for them. And this shareholder
advantage is highly concentrated: recent data indicates that in approximate terms,
presently 1% of the people own 54.9% of the corporate wealth and 10% own
over 93.5%, leaving 90% of the people (poor and middle-class people) owning
less 6.4% of corporate wealth (i.e., little or none). 5
(1961); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967);
LOUIS O. ELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP
REVOLUTION THROUGH BINARY ECONOMICS (1991). The authoritative and most complete source of writings by
Louis Kelso can be found on the website of the Kelso Institute. See THE KELSO INSTITUTE,
http://kelsoinstitute.org/louiskelso/ (last visited October 3, 2021).
4. See generally Adam Hayes, Shareholder Equity Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholderequityratio.asp (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (noting that the “lower the ratio result, the more debt a company has used to pay for its assets”).
5. Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2019: Median Wealth
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“Thus, although business corporations have proven to be excellent means to
acquire capital with the earnings of capital in industrialized economies, their
benefits have not yet been made available to a substantial degree to poor and
middle-class people.” 6
In contemporary corporate capitalism, this legislated advantage, limited
primarily to wealthy people in proportion to their existing wealth (operating 24/7
globally), is a primary—if not the primary—cause of wealth concentration and
unequal economic opportunity.
For the bottom 90% of the American people who experience virtually no
direct benefit from corporate capital acquisition with the future earnings of
capital, the economic experience is not a happy story. Figure 1 reveals the
consequences of exclusion from substantial participation in the legislated
corporate infrastructure that facilitates capital acquisition with its future earnings.
400 %
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Figure 1. Cumulative percent change in real annual earnings (by earnings group), 1979–2017. Note: Index
1979 = 0%. Source: Hall et al. (2019).

Although from 1998 to 2014, the bottom 90% have experienced a tiny
increase in real earnings, and although widely taught law-and-neoclassical
economic analysis predicts lower prices from allocative efficiency gains, for
Rebounds . . . but Not Enough, 56 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28383, Jan. 2021),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28383 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
6. ROBERT ASHFORD & DEMETRI KANTARELIS, ENHANCING POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS EARNING
CAPACITY WITH STOCK ACQUISITION MORTGAGE LOANS 13 (Addleton Acad. Publishers 2016).
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essential goods and services (such as health care, education, and child care), most
people face a dramatic increase in prices (Figure 2).
225 %
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and childcare
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75 %
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Medical care services
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Figure 2. Price changes 1997 to 2018. Note: The black lines indicate prices (of non-tradeable goods and
services) that are typically not subject to market forces. The green lines indicate the prices (of tradable
goods and services) that are subject to competition/market forces. The dotted line represents wages.
Source: Hall et al. (2019). Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Of course, only approximately 25% of the huge income gains of the 0.1%
and the 1% are the result of corporate wealth acquisition with the future earnings
of capital. Much of the rest originate from earnings previously acquired and the
better labor market opportunities available to wealthier people. But the legislated
opportunity to acquire capital with the future earnings of capital is an important
gateway to these latter advantages.
In light of the foregoing, the question posed in the title to this symposium,
For Whose Benefit Public Corporations?, could be rephrased to raise as follows:
“For whose benefit is the legislated practical, market opportunity to acquire
corporate wealth with future capital earnings financed with non-recourse
corporate credit?”
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Further, should this legislated market opportunity be preferentially extended
to people roughly in proportion to their existing wealth, which as a practical
matter it is today, or is there a societally wealth-enhancing way to extend this
legislated market opportunity more broadly, democratically, and competitively
without redistribution? The principles of inclusive capitalism indicate that there
is.
The major impediment to a more inclusive capitalism that would extend to
all people the competitive market opportunity to acquire an interest in corporate
capital acquisition with the future earnings of that capital in amounts that are not
limited in proportion to their (meager or negative) existing wealth is not
primarily a defect in the law but rather a defect in widely accepted economic
theory. This defect prevents people from fully comprehending three major
economic concerns: the dynamics of per-capita growth, optimal efficiency, and
fuller employment (of both labor and capital) and, consequently, their
relationship to credit-worthy real corporate capital acquisition.
The defect is a fundamentally important missing principle that appears
nowhere in classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, and other approaches to micro and
macroeconomics. The missing principle can be expressed as follows:
A broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital
creates the rational expectation of more broadly distributed discretionary
capital income in future years to people with a higher propensity to
consume and therefore the rational incentive for more credit-worthy
investment in labor and capital in earlier years.
This is a principle of fuller employment and per capita growth called “the
principle of binary economic growth.”
Based on extensive conversations with professors of economics and
corporate finance and on much analysis, compared to all other approaches in
response to the question “for whose benefit public corporations?” of which I am
aware, I believe that a widespread understanding of the principle of binary
economic growth could be reasonably expected (without redistribution) to
produce for corporate stockholders, other stakeholders, and society substantially
greater material benefits. These include: (1) enhanced earnings for poor and
middle-class people; (2) enhanced corporate and shareholder wealth; (3) reduced
need for welfare dependence, government spending, and borrowing, and reduced
tax rates; (4) enhanced retirement security; (5) enhanced sovereign creditworthiness; (6) reduced systemic risk; (7) enhanced sustainable fuller
employment and per capita economic growth; and (8) greater efficiency.
A growing number of professional economists from prestigious schools have
come to appreciate the importance of this corporate capital ownershipbroadening approach to a more inclusive capitalism, and thirteen have signed a
letter of support characterizing it as “the most important contribution to
economic theory in many decades: an idea with many practical, beneficial policy
14
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implications for both current and future generations.” According to the letter,
“without redistribution,” this approach to a more inclusive capitalism “reveals
how business corporations may voluntarily choose to broaden their share
ownership to include poor and middle-class people, enhance the earning capacity
of those people, improve corporate profitability as well as shareholder wealth,
and lay the structural economic foundation for sustainable growth.” 7
Attesting to the novelty of the principle of binary economic growth, the letter
continues:
Significantly, this foundational principle of fuller employment
and growth appears nowhere in the antecedent history of economic
thought. It appears neither in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations nor in any
of the writings of any of the classical economists who build on its
foundation. Yet it has implications that (1) alter the foundational,
classical economic analysis of prices, production, and per-capita growth
and (2) reveal how greater per-capital growth can be achieved by
broadening capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.
It appears neither in the neoclassical economic analyses of
efficiency advanced by Alfred Marshall, Leon Walras, and their
contemporaries, nor in the analysis of later neoclassical economists, nor
in the various contemporary neoclassical growth theories such as the
approach advanced by Nobel Prize Laureate Robert Lucas. Yet its
implications alter the neoclassical analysis of prices which are
foundational to any measures of efficiency and productivity and to any
modeling used in economic forecasting. Moreover, it reveals how greater
benefits of efficiency and productivity can be achieved by broadening
capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.
It appears neither in the fuller-employment analysis of John
Maynard Keynes nor any of the economists that build on or modify his
analysis. Significantly, it can be understood as transforming Keynesian
general theory of fuller employment from a short-run analysis into a
long-run analysis in which the distribution of capital acquisition is a
fundamental variable. It fundamentally enriches the Keynesian analysis
of how market economies can suffer substantial, chronic unemployment
and reveals how corporate finance can be structured to achieve fuller
employment voluntarily without redistribution. It appears neither in the
creative construction analysis of Joseph Schumpeter, nor in the analyses
the Austrian economists such as Friedrich Hayek, nor in other analyses
7.
Letter
from
Economists
to
Professor
Robert
Ashford
(Apr.
14,
2021),
http://law.syr.edu/uploads/docs/deans-faculty/Ashford_Economist_Letter_in_Support_of_Inclusive_Capitalism041421.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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that focus on the important role of the entrepreneur, yet it significantly
enriches those analyses and, if widely understood, would greatly enhance
the growth predicted by advocates of those approaches. 8
Although the principle of binary economic growth appears nowhere (and is
implicitly denied) in the economic approaches set forth above, it is based on a
widely accepted principle of corporate finance: credit-worthy capital acquisition
is always future-looking. In the case of corporations other than financial
corporations, it can be understood as a four-stage process. In stage one,
corporations receive cash or property in exchange for equity shares or debt
obligations, or from revenues. In stage two, they employ real capital and labor to
build productive capacity. In stage three, they employ that productive capacity
(labor and capital) to produce goods and services. In stage four, they sell what
they can of their production in exchange for additional revenues. Thus, it is the
expected credit-worthy demand in stage four that provides the investment
incentive in stage one.
As explained in Sections 2 and 3 below, one of the implications of the
understanding of binary economic growth is that following retirement of the
acquisition debt, if a corporation can capture a sufficient portion of the increased
consumer demand resulting from the broader distribution of future capital income
occasioned from broadening its capital ownership, then any corporate capital
acquisition that can be financed with money borrowed directly by the corporation
may be financed more profitably (to the corporation, pre-existing shareholders,
and its “new shareholder” stakeholders) by way of ownership-broadening real
capital acquisition financing.
II. PRINCIPLES OF INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM
This section presents the foundational principles of inclusive capitalism.
Taken together, they establish a distinct principle of per-capita growth,
efficiency, and fuller employment not found in the antecedent history of
economic thought. It then explains how these principles qualitatively
fundamentally alter other widely accepted economic principles. Section 3 then
(1) explores ways to implement this voluntary approach, (2) identifies
impediments to its practical implementation, and (3) explores some ways that
would help to overcome the impediments identified.
A. Foundational Principles
The following principles are helpful to understanding inclusive capitalism
and its effect on other principles of economic theory:

8. Id.
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(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Both labor and real capital (a) do work, (b) are equally fundamental
factors of production, and (c) (via property rights) distribute
income; 9
Although advancing technology may be understood to make labor
more productive, advancing technology may also be understood to
make capital more much productive than labor in task after task;
The prospect of a broader distribution of capital acquisition with the
earnings of capital carries with it the prospect of more broadly
distributed capital earning capacity and earnings in future years to
people with a higher propensity to consume, which therefore
provides the expectation of market incentives to profitably employ
more labor and capital in earlier years (this is the principle of binary
economic growth); and
Per-capita economic growth is primarily the result of the increasing
“productiveness” of capital and the distribution of its acquisition
(rather than the result of the increasing productivity of labor and/or
capital).

As noted in the economists’ letter, the growth principle of inclusive
capitalism provides a distinct understanding of: (1) per-capita growth (the
fundamental question explored by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations); (2) the
distributive wealth-enhancing consequences of allocating productive inputs
according to their marginal productivity; (3) fuller employment as reflected in the
analysis of John Maynard Keynes in the General Theory and Paul Samuelson’s
Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis; and (4) exogenous and endogenous
neoclassical growth theories. As explained in Section II.B below, it also provides
a distinct understanding regarding (1) the market relationship between value and
price, and (2) the revenue-generating and earning capacity of capital.
B. Productivity vs. Productiveness
Inclusive capitalism distinguishes the concepts of productivity (pervasively
important in conventional economic analysis) and productiveness. Productivity is
a ratio of some measure of output divided by a denominator reflecting some
factor input, usually labor. In contrast, productiveness retroactively means “work
done” and prospectively “productive capacity.”
Consider the work of sawing boards: 10 boards per hour with a hand saw and
100 boards per hour with a machine saw. Working with a machine saw rather

9. “Capital” (with or without the adjective “real” includes land, animals, structures, and machinesanything capable of being owned and employed in production. “Real capital” also includes “capital intangibles”
like patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and labor contracts. It does not include “financial capital,” which is an
ownership interest in real capital. According to inclusive capitalism, financial capital does not do work, but is a
residual claim on the work done by (earnings of) real capital. See also 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (West 2021).
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than a hand saw, the worker can saw ten times as many boards in the same time
and therefore has become ten times as productive and has ten times the
productivity. But when sawing each board, with the machine saw, the worker is
doing much less work. Per unit of production, the work done by the sawyer
(“labor productiveness”) has decreased, and the work done by the saw (“capital
productiveness”) has increased. Given the total production done in one hour, the
machine saw is essentially doing all the extra work. Thus, in addition to the view
that the primary role of capital is to increase labor productivity, there is another
(binary) way to understand the primary role of capital in contributing to per
capita economic growth: namely, to do an increasing portion of the total work
done. Although neither the hand saw nor the machine saw would saw any boards
without the work of the sawyer, so too the sawyer would not saw any boards
without the work of the saw.
The productiveness of capital is more clearly revealed in the work of hauling.
In one hour, a person can haul one sack one mile and is exhausted. Using a horse,
ten sacks can be hauled four times as far yielding a fortyfold increase in
production. Using a truck, 500 sacks can be hauled 40 times as far, yielding a
20,000-fold increase in production. According to inclusive capitalism, the horse
and truck (like the machine saw) do more than increase labor productivity; the
horse and truck are essentially doing all the extra work. Although to be
productive, the horse must be led and the truck must be driven, the work of
leading and driving is not the work of hauling done by the horse and truck.
Thus, inclusive capitalism distinguishes between:
(1)
(2)

“productivity” (a ratio of the output of all factors of production,
divided by the input of one factor, usually labor), and
“productiveness” (a special focus of inclusive capitalism, which
retrospectively means “work done” and prospectively means
“productive capacity”).

With technological advances, by definition, labor productivity can rise while
labor’s share of the work done declines.
C. The Meaning of “Equally Fundamental”
Many people, including Adam Smith, share an anthropocentric vision that
premises economic activity on the work of people. In English and other
languages, there is a special word for the work of humans (“labor”), but no
special word for the work of capital and other non-human factors that contribute
to production. Rather than viewing the productive contribution of labor and
capital as distinct sources of production (just as two workers would constitute
two sources of production when both are needed to complete tasks), conventional
thinking views the contribution of capital as amplifying labor productivity and
18
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considers the economic contributions of the non-human factors to be dependent
on people. However, according to inclusive capitalism, labor is much more
dependent on the work of non-human factors of production than the other way
around. The sun shines and rain falls without human effort. With help from the
sun, rain, and earth (and countless worms and other organisms), vegetation
produces oxygen, food, and medicines; animals produce food and medicines, do
other work, and provide other benefits. Physical structures and materials support
and protect us. Humans make productive contributions, but their capacity is
limited. Since the dawn of civilization, beginning with rudimentary tool-making,
the discovery of agriculture, and the domestication of animals, the great growth
in per-capita productive capacity of society is not primarily the result of people
working harder, longer, smarter, or more productively, but is rather mostly
achieved by unleashing and guiding the far greater independently productive
powers of the non-human contributions to production that are available by
discovering and employing the materials, forces, and powers of nature.
The assertion that labor and capital each do work and are equally
fundamental factors of production does not negate the fact that (1) both labor and
capital are generally needed to do most kinds of work, and (2) labor is needed to
invent, design, build, install, operate, maintain, store, repair, manage, and finance
capital. But the work of labor needed to employ capital is not the work of the
capital employed. And in a market system, people would not be compensated for
the labor needed to employ capital if the employed capital did not do much more
work than the labor needed to employ it.
D. Seven Growth Enhancing Powers of Capital
The recognition that capital does work just as labor does work reveals that
capital has seven powers that contribute to per-capita economic growth, distinct
from its effect on labor productivity, and the contribution of labor to economic
growth. Capital can:
(1)

(2)
(3)

Replace labor (doing what was formerly done by labor). (Such
“growth” is reflected by an increase in leisure and potential
unemployment depending on the distribution of capital acquisition,
but no increase in physical production);
Vastly supplement the work of labor by employing capital to do
much more of the kind of work that humans can do (e.g., by the
much greater hauling that can be done employing horses or trucks);
Do work that labor can never do (e.g., elevators quickly lift tons
thousands of feet; airplanes fly; scientific instruments unleash
forces that create computer chips that cannot be made by hand; fruit
trees make fruit while all farmers can do is assist in the process);
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Work without labor (e.g., washing machines, vending machines,
automated bank tellers and toll takers, robots, and wild fruit-bearing
trees);
Pay for itself with its future earnings (the basic rule of business
investment);
Distribute income needed to purchase its output (the logic of
double-entry book-keeping); and
Broaden the distribution of its ownership with its future earnings.

The first four powers are the “real economy” powers of capital; the latter
three are financial powers revealed in a private property, market economy with a
stable credit system protected by a reliable legal system. Only the first directly
involves the substitution of capital for labor. Although marginal efficiency theory
is widely employed as the foundation for general theories of neoclassical growth,
in fact, the capital/labor substitution process is only one component of wealth
enhancement (operating after the creation of greatly increased productive
capacity), and its wealth-enhancing contribution to efficient pricing and resource
allocation is limited for reasons discussed below.
E. The Distributive Power of Capital
The sixth and seventh growth-enhancing capital powers reveal that capital
works on both sides of the economic equation with vastly increased:
(1)
(2)

productive capacity and production, and
capacity to distribute income and leisure.

Although useful, the productivity concept can be somewhat confusing and
misleading. Productivity ratios may inform decisions of whether and how much
to invest in additional units of labor and capital, and the resultant allocation of
resources may well enhance production, profitability, and wealth. But ratios do
not do work. People and things do work. Per unit of output, an increase in the
labor productivity ratio occurs whether it is a labor or capital component that is
doing more or less of the per-unit production and therefore fails to fully
comprehend the full distributional consequences of technological advance and
the distribution of capital acquisition.
In light of these powers and of how production and productive capacity has
changed since 1776, in countless aspects of work, the principles of inclusive
capitalism hold that increased production (growth) is primarily the result of
increasing capital productiveness and the distribution of its acquisition rather
than increasing labor and capital productivity.
Although it is good to be able to earn by laboring, it is better to be able to
also earn by owning; and an increasingly inclusive capitalism will more robustly
empower everyone to earn increasingly by owning as well as by working. In a
20
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private property, market economy, it is the capacity of capital both to do much
more work and to distribute much more income and leisure to people (even as
they sleep) that explains how the broader distribution of its acquisition not only
enriches and helps to liberate every individual who is able to acquire it, but also
has an immensely positive systemic impact on capital accumulation, fuller
employment, and per-capita growth.
F. Economic Theories of Value and Price
Also central to understanding whether and how broader capital acquisition
increases per-capita growth (and the earning capacity of capital and its rate of
return and cost recovery) is the theory of value and competitive pricing.
According to Smith, labor is not only the most fundamental source of production,
but also the only fundamental source of value and the primary productive
determinant of price. Smith conceived of all value and prices of all production as
ultimately a function of (1) the cost of labor and capital to produce it, and (2) the
cost of labor commanded in exchange for it. All of these costs (including the cost
of capital) are functions of the individual decision of whether to work or remain
idle at an offered wage. The work to acquire anything is an expression of the
value to the worker of the thing to be acquired. Conversely, things are worth
some function of the work people are willing to do to acquire them. 10 Thus,
according to Smith, the distribution of capital acquisition, in itself, has no notable
effect on prices. The same can be said for the marginal productivity approach of
neoclassical economics and the Keynesian approach to fuller employment in
which apart from money and time, “the unit of labor . . . [is] the sole physical
unit.” 11 In such analyses, the distribution of capital acquisition is as irrelevant to
prices and values as it is to the supply of capital, fuller employment, and growth.
However, the recognition that capital does work and earns income for its
owner belies the false notion that the decision to work or remain idle is the only
source of value and measure of price. 12 The value of goods and services is not
10. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 30–36, 56, 326, 344–345 (Edwin Cannan ed., Smith Random
House 1937) (1776).
11. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 213–14
(Harcourt, Brace & World 1936).
12. JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY OR THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION,
AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH, xl-xli (Batoche Books, 6th Am. ed. 2000). Of the classical economists,
apparently only Jean Baptiste Say identified in writing Smith’s erroneous foundational assumption: “To the
labour of man alone he [Smith] ascribes the power of producing values. This is an error. A more exact analysis
demonstrates [. . .] that all values are derived from the operation of labour, or rather from the industry of man,
combined with the operation of those agents which nature and capital furnish him. Dr. Smith did not, therefore,
obtain a thorough knowledge of the most important phenomenon in production; this has led him into some
erroneous conclusions, such, for instance, as attributing a gigantic influence to the division of labor, or rather to
the separation of employments. This influence, however, is by no means inappreciable or even inconsiderable;
but the greatest wonders of this description are not so much owing to any peculiar property in human labor, as
to the use we make of the powers of nature. His ignorance of this principle precluded him from establishing the
true theory of machinery in relation to the production of wealth.”
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only a function of what work people are willing to do to pay for them, but also a
function of what work they (as owners) are willing to employ their capital to do.
The people who have no capital and want sacks hauled must either do the work
themselves or do the work necessary to pay someone (or something) else to do
the hauling. In rationalizing a market system of free exchange, this logic (in
essence, the labor theory of value) obscures and implicitly denies the fact that
people who own horses (capital) and want sacks hauled can do work and express
value not only via their labor but also as owners by employing their horses to do
the hauling. 13
According to inclusive capitalism, the willingness of a laborer to work at a
given wage depends on that person’s competitive opportunity to acquire capital
with its earnings and then receive its full return. Therefore:
(1)
(2)

the theory of marginal productivity that underlies conventional
understanding of the relative employment of capital and labor in
production, and
the factor income shares derived from production

are significantly dependent on the market distribution of income that flows from
competitive access to capital acquisition. But that understanding is nowhere
reflected in mainstream economics and econometrics.
Competitive market pricing requires no entry barriers. Without widespread
understanding (among market participants) of the principle of binary economic
growth, competitive access to the same legislated and government-supported
financial infrastructure routinely available to well-capitalized people to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital (and thereby through ownership to produce
goods and express value) is not open to most people as a practical matter.
From a conventional economic perspective, the distribution of competitive
access to capital acquisition has no important impact on prices, capital/labor
substitution, employment, and factor income shares. According to inclusive
capitalism, if capital acquisition is limited as a practical matter to a small fraction
of the population and primarily in proportion to their existing wealth, markets
cannot be efficient in their pricing of labor, capital, and the goods and services
produced by them, and available labor and capital cannot be employed efficiently
at its full potential.

13. Many economists claim that modern economics has extricated itself from the labor theory of value in
favor of analysis based on “revealed preferences.” However, in present capitalist economies in which
approximately 95% of the people earn little or no current capital income, the prices of the vast array of
consumer goods are significantly related to the compensated work people are willing to do to acquire them,
somewhat augmented by redistributed income and consumer debt. It is only when one sees the prices of highend goods ($50 million for a Rembrandt or a Mansion, or millions for paraphernalia of celebrities, that the
earnings of capital have an appreciable effect on market prices. See generally ASHFORD & KANTARELIS, supra
note 6.
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G. Inclusive Capitalism and Mainstream Theories of Growth, Efficiency, and
Fuller Employment: The Importance of the Distribution of Capital Acquisition
The asserted positive relationship between the distribution of capital
acquisition and growth (i.e., the principle of binary economic growth) is not
based on the behavioral premise that people will work more productively if they:
(1) own more capital, (2) own the land, tools, and/or businesses they work with,
and/or (3) have an ownership stake in their employers’ businesses. Such
productivity gains are independent of binary economic growth. Although most
advocates of inclusive capitalism accept this behavioral premise, it is neither
unique to inclusive capitalism nor inconsistent with the fuller employment
growth theories of mainstream economics. Rather, the unique premise of
inclusive capitalism is that the promise of broader capital acquisition with the
earnings of capital will in itself result in the fuller employment of both labor and
capital because the broader distribution of future capital income among people
who will spend a higher portion of their income on consumer goods will increase
future consumer demand and thereby increase incentives for more employment
of labor and capital in earlier years.
A survey of growth, efficiency, and fuller employment theories found in the
history of economic thought reveals that means to enhance wealth can be
understood as the result of: (1) increasing labor specialization and free trade (as
Smith maintained); (2) decisions regarding the most efficient and productive
employment of productive inputs based on their marginal productivity (as
maintained by neoclassical efficiency theorists); (3) various theories of
entrepreneurial decision-making and “creative destruction”; (4) various so-called
Keynesian theories of fuller employment based on the failure of market
economies to distribute effective demand needed to employ more fully available
productive inputs profitably at least in the short run; and (5) various neoclassical
exogenous and endogenous growth theories. However, none of these approaches
treats the market distribution of capital acquisition as a fundamental causal factor
affecting per capita growth, greater efficiency, and fuller employment. In
contrast, according to inclusive capitalism, per capita growth, efficiency, and
fuller employment can also be understood as the result of capital doing an everincreasing portion of the total work done and as being capable of distributing (via
property rights) more or less demand for employment of labor and capital
depending on the distribution of its acquisition.
Although differing significantly, the foregoing widely taught approaches to
per capita growth, greater efficiency, and fuller employment reduce globally to a
political debate between “austerity vs. stimulus,” and in the USA, to a debate
between “too much government is the problem” and “more government is the
solution.” Usually, these strategies are seen as competitive alternatives. In
contrast, the principle of binary economic growth is an “add on” not an
alternative. It does not compete with either approach; instead, it makes both
approaches more affordable and perhaps more politically achievable.
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III. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM TO THE USA
ECONOMY
To explore how publicly traded corporations can employ the principles of
inclusive capitalism (voluntarily and without government mandate or
redistribution) to increase corporate wealth and share value by including other
stakeholders in the legislated advantages of corporate finance, consider the 3,000
largest, prime-credit-worthy publicly traded corporations in the USA (roughly,
the Russell-3000 Index). Consider how a board of directors meeting of a typical
Russell-3000 Index Corporation (“A-Co”) might proceed both before and after
inclusive capitalism is as widely taught as the other economic approaches
mentioned above. As corporate fiduciaries, the duty of A-Co’s directors is not to
maximize share price at every point in time (“short-termism”) or to maximize
shareholder profits, 14 but rather to maximize corporate wealth throughout A-Co’s
perpetual (indefinite) existence. Accordingly, at its board meeting, A-Co’s
directors would approve A-Co’s capital acquisition spending for the next year
and (subject to reconsideration) consider and perhaps approve annual capital
acquisition plans well into the future. A-Co plans to finance approximately 25%
of next year’s capital acquisition with borrowed money. Management believes it
can profitably borrow at or near prime (say 5% and earn at least 8–10%) and the
lender agrees.
Before the plan is approved, Bill Gates approaches A-Co and says, “Without
changing your present plans in any way, I believe there is a synergy gain
achievable via cooperation between A-Co. and Micro-Soft. However, the gain is
sufficiently attractive to me only if I can gain as a stockholder in both companies.
Instead of A-Co’s borrowing money, if A-Co sells me stock at its present fair
market value I will invest in A-Co the same amount as A-Co presently plans to
borrow.”
Corporate law does not allow A-Co’s directors to reject this offer without a
good faith consideration of its expected value. The directors have a fiduciary
obligation of due diligence to determine whether Bill’s offer is more wealthenhancing to A-Co and its existing shareholders than the debt-financing
alternative; and (considering all the risks) if Bill’s offer seemed to be more
wealth enhancing, A-Co’s directors would need to have a sound reason for
rejecting it. The same would be true in the case of competing offers from Warren
Buffet, Jeff Bezos, or Mark Zuckerberg.
Before the decision is made, if Bill, Warren, Jeff, and Mark were to say,
“Instead of using cash or borrowing money secured by my assets, I plan to pay
for A-Co’s stock with borrowed money secured by third-party capital credit (i.e.,
loan default) insurance,” would A-Co care? The answer from A-Co’s financial
14. Generally, shareholders have no rights to profits except when dividends approved by the board of
directors or when the corporation is “in dissolution” at which time the corporation no longer has credit to
acquire capital with its future earnings.
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and legal advisors is: “No, as long as the loan to the investor does not materially,
adversely affect the prospective synergy gain.” Thus, like the boards of all
Russell-3000 companies, after a due diligence evaluation, A-Co’s board of
directors would probably be duty-bound obligated to choose the most
competitive offer—i.e., the offer that maximizes A-Co’s wealth and share value.
And if supported by due diligence, the business judgment rule would protect the
decision.
As long as inclusive capitalism is not taught along with the other economic
approaches mentioned above, our story would end. Corporations would be
largely limited in ways to acquire additional capital by using discretionary
revenue, retained earnings, borrowed money, or sale of stock to investors wealthy
enough to pay for it with cash, assets, or secured credit. Capital acquisition would
accrue to the vast majority of people primarily in proportion to their existing
wealth. However, after the fuller employment principle of inclusive capitalism is
as widely taught as the other widely taught fuller employment principles (i.e., per
capita growth, optimal efficiency, and full employment), people will have an
additional understanding of how a more inclusive approach to capital acquisition
might work and how a more broadly distributed prosperity might be more
profitably achieved. Of course, the “people” would include not only the teachers
and their current students, but also former students—i.e., the directors, officers,
legal and financial advisors, trustees, etc., of the Russell-3000 corporations
(including lenders, insurers, and mutual fund companies, and mainstream media
companies), charitable foundations, think-tanks, policy institutes, labor unions,
and public servants in all branches and levels of government having
responsibilities related to economic prosperity, equal opportunity, and justice,
pension funds, and private investors.
Section A explains how the principles of inclusive capitalism would (after
they become as widely taught as the other principles of fuller employment are
taught) provide vast numbers of poor and middle-class people entry into the
corporate board room (represented by financially sophisticated fiduciaries just as
richer people are) to make competitive offers for shares of credit-worthy
corporations like A-Co (offers that must be evaluated by corporate fiduciaries
with due diligence regarding their corporate wealth-enhancing potential). Section
A then explores the terms and wealth-enhancing potential of the new ownershipbroadening offer in the aggregate (i.e., economy-wide) as though: (1) all Russell3000 companies are presented with an ownership-broadening offer (described
below), (2) every year, each individual corporation is free to employ the
ownership-broadening approach to finance whatever (including no) portion of
that corporation’s capital wealth-maximizing acquisition requirements, and (3)
each corporation is able to capture a sufficient portion of the potential increased
gain in consumer demand for its products that results from its capital ownershipbroadening to make the ownership-broadening financing the most competitive
alternative. Section B then explores how, at the microeconomic level, capital
ownership-broadening corporations may be able to capture a sufficient share of
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the increased demand caused by their ownership-broadening to render the offer
competitive with other financing alternatives.
A. Aggregate Analysis
After inclusive capitalism is widely taught, all the major decision-makers in
the institutions mentioned above, along with a substantial portion of the general
public, will understand that broadening capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital is an additional means of enhancing future consumer demand, per capita
growth, efficiency, and fuller employment. A mutual fund company like
Vanguard, Fidelity, or TIAA-Cref (always eager and competing for more
customers) might approach A-Co with a synergy gain, perhaps greater than all of
those mentioned above. For example, a representative of TIAA-Cref might make
the following presentation to A-Co’s board of directors:
The potential synergy gain TIAA-Cref brings to A-Co is the
pent-up appetite for A-Co’s products and services that its (1) employees;
(2) customers; (3) neighbors (those living in cities near A-Co facilities
and in “company towns” in which A-Co is a, or the, major employer; and
(4) welfare recipients living in areas where A-Co sells its products
(welfare recipients that are presently being supported by taxes on the
income of A-Co and its employees).
This group of people will be referred to as “the ownershipbroadening beneficiaries,” or simply “the beneficiaries.” Just as A-Co,
Bill, Warren, and the others can borrow funds with secured capital credit
to invest directly or indirectly in A-Co’s credit-worthy investments,
acting as an investment trustee for A-Co’s ownership-broadening
beneficiaries, TIAA-Cref can establish a constituency trust for the benefit
of corporation employees, customers, and neighbors, including welfare
recipients. With the trust as the borrower, TIAA-Cref can arrange the
same sort of financing for the beneficiaries. A-Co’s prospective lender
has already determined that A-Co’s planned use of the loan funds is
credit-worthy; in light of the synergy gains offered by Bill and the others,
the capital credit insurers apparently also agree. If TIAA-Cref’s synergy
offer is yet more competitive, it will make A-Co’s capital acquisitions
yet more credit-worthy.
Presently in terms of their current consumer income, the vast
majority of these potential A-Co beneficiaries are trying to survive
economically on wages and welfare alone in a capitalist economy in
which production is becoming increasingly more capital-intensive.
Without a widely shared understanding of inclusive capitalism, they have
not had competitive access to capital acquisition with the future revenues
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and earnings of capital in the way that richer people routinely do (even as
they sleep). TIAA-Cref can structure the capital acquisition financing in
a way that would steadily increase the earnings of A-Co beneficiaries
and also enhance the rate of return on A-Co’s assets, discretionary
revenues, and income and reduce its taxes.
Figure 3 illustrates the potential wealth-enhancing, growth-sustaining
features of an ownership-broadening economy:
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Figure 3. Projecting Binary Economic Growth

Based on the assumptions specified below, Figure 3 shows the number of
years of annual ownership-broadening acquisitions that will have paid for
themselves over time. It assumes:
(1)
A seven-year cost recovery period for capital investment (The same
principles apply for a ten-year period);
(2)
In every year, some number (N) of an economy’s credit-worthy
companies have profitably utilized inclusive capitalism financing to
acquire some percentage (X) of their capital investments;
(3)
The capital credit insurance is profitably priced to repay the lending
banks for those financings that fail to repay their acquisition loans so
that X is net of capital investment failures;
(4)
N, X, and the rate of return (R) on capital remain constant
throughout the period. (With growth, N, X and R would increase);
(5)
The shares issued are “full return” shares” – i.e., the corporation is
required to pay to the trustee (in this instance TIAA-Cref) the full
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(6)
(7)

return on those shares (net of depreciation and reserves for research
and development);
Because the corporation has no use of that return, there is no federal
or state corporate income tax on that full return; and
The trustee is required to pay the dividends first to satisfy the
acquisition debt obligations to the lender and then to distribute the
(taxable) income to the beneficiaries.

The broadening distribution of capital acquisition and income will increase
over the years and thereby provide the basis for binary economic growth. Each
year after the initial cost recovery period, an additional year of ownershipbroadening capital acquisition will have paid for itself and will be distributing
capital income to poor and middle-class people. Consistent with the assumption
of a seven-year capital cost recovery period, Figure 3 shows the steady growth in
annual capital acquisitions. In the eighth year, the first annual acquisition of
capital will have paid for itself and begin paying its full return to the new owners.
In the ninth year, the second annual capital acquisition will begin paying its full
return to the new owners. In fourteen years, 50%, and in the twenty-eighth year,
75%, of the annual capital acquisitions will have paid for themselves, and will be
paying their full annual return to the new owners, and so on. In the long run, the
linkage between supply (in the form of the incremental productiveness of capital)
and demand (resulting from the widespread market distribution of capital income
to consumers) approaches 100%. The more ownership-broadening financing that
is undertaken, the greater the distributional growth effects. If the rate of return on
capital investment increases (as the principles of inclusive capitalism predict
would occur in an ownership-broadening economy), then the curve shown in
Figure 3 would rise more steeply and approach the specified percentages sooner.
1. Maintaining Market Share in a Growing Economy
To maintain market share in the projected growing economy, producers will
have to increase production and productive capacity based on their capital
investment planning horizon before distributing capital income to its new
owners. With a capital cost recovery period of seven years, and a capital
investment planning horizon of four years, market incentives for increased
capital investment and labor employment by producers of consumer goods might
materialize for some producers in the fourth year. Furthermore, the producers of
capital goods needed by the producers of consumer goods to increase their
productive capacity may experience market incentives for increased capital
spending and labor employment as early as the first year.
Some additional effects of broader capital acquisition that will enhance the
prospects of sustainable fuller employment and economic growth and may be
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immediately reflected in the prospects of an economy based on inclusive capital,
are:
(1)
Reduction in Welfare Dependence and Welfare Expense: As
capital income is more broadly distributed to welfare-dependent
people, government transfer payments can be reduced.
(2)
Increase in Tax Revenues: As capital income is more broadly
distributed to individual taxpayers, they will pay more in taxes,
thereby increasing government revenues.
(3)
Reduction in Tax Rates: With the reduction in welfare dependence
and the widely experienced increase in taxable personal and
corporate income, there is the basis for a reduction in tax rates while
maintaining and even increasing government revenues.
(4)
Tax Benefits for Ownership-Broadening Corporations:
Participating corporations whose shares (1) provide beneficiaries
with additional taxable income, or (2) allow for a reduction in
welfare payments, may be given a tax credit or deduction
representing some portion of the increased government revenues
and/or reduced government spending occasioned by the earnings
distributed to beneficiaries as dividends on the inclusive capitalism
stock of the participating corporations. (E.g., every dollar dividend
paid to a welfare beneficiary might reduce welfare payments by fifty
cents and earn the corporation that distributed the dividend a twentyfive-cent tax credit.
(5)
Enhanced Financial Soundness of Private and GovernmentSponsored Retirement Plans (and Therefore, Greater
Retirement Security): These effects could reasonably be expected
to result from enhanced corporate profitability, wealth, and sharevalue and a lower need for government spending.
(6)
Enhanced Sovereign Credit Ratings: Financial data used to assess
sovereign credit-worthiness will improve (1) government revenues,
expenditures, and debt and (2) GDP. In light of the sustained effect
of ownership-broadening financing set forth above, the creditworthiness of the sovereign debt of countries that employ the
inclusive capitalism approach will likely increase.
(7)
More and Cheaper Financing for Start-Ups: As poor and middleclass people are provided a more competitive means of acquiring the
least risky, most insurable, capital acquisition, well-capitalized
people will have incentive to move further out on the investment risk
curve. This will provide more financial capital for entrepreneurial
activities, the development of new technologies, start-ups, and
smaller companies.
(8)
Less Risky and Expensive, More Insurable, and Profitable
Investment: The growing capital-based consumer demand generated
by inclusive capitalism financing will make more capital investment
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(9)

(10)

credit-worthy and profitable and less risky, and therefore more
insurable, less expensive, and more profitable.
Reduced Amplitude of Boom-and-Bust Cycles: With a broadening
distribution of capital ownership and income—so that the supply
generated by technological change and increased investment will be
increasingly balanced by a corresponding increase in consumer
demand—the amplitude of the booms and busts of business cycles
will be reduced.
Reduced Systemic Risk. With greater source-of-income
diversification from a growing portion of consumer income earned
from the growing productiveness of capital, prospective consumer
demand will be more stable and predictable as it grows more in sync
with increasing productive capacity.

B. From Macro to the Microeconomic, Individual Corporate Level: Solving the
First Actor, Free-Rider, and Coordination Problem
Even with the prospect of these widely shared benefits, a problem combining
first-actor, free-rider, coordination, and/or collective-action problems
(hereinafter, “free-riding” or “the free-rider problem”) would remain. The freerider problem inhibits ownership-broadening financing because there is no
guarantee (and good reason to doubt) that a capital ownership-broadening
corporation would capture a sufficient portion of the projected aggregate benefits
from ownership-broadening capital to make ownership-broadening the most
wealth-enhancing alternative compared to other financing techniques.
For example, suppose A-Co manufactures automobiles and would find the
ownership-broadening technique the most corporate-wealth-enhancing approach,
but only if it could capture sufficient gains from the consequences of doing so. If
A-Co were to “encapitalize” its employees, customers (who previously bought its
autos), neighbors, and select welfare recipients, those beneficiaries would likely
spend their discretionary capital income at least initially on immediate needs and
wants of food, clothing, shelter, utilities, communication, healthcare, and
entertainment. To the extent they bought autos, they might prefer autos made by
A-Co competitors. Thus, companies that chose not to broaden or only minimally
broaden their share ownership would “free ride” on benefits of more broadly
distributed consumer demand created by other corporations engaged much more
substantially in ownership-broadening.
Consider this problem from the perspective of four types of corporations: (1)
producers that have an ongoing relationship to their customers either by contract
or convenience such as telephone, power, water, internet, airlines, insurance, and
financial companies, including banks; (2) producers of staples, household
supplies, clothing, and other goods and services of the types typically bought by
the corporation’s employees, neighbors and the general public (including welfare
recipients) such as national grocery stores, retail stores, restaurants, and service
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stations; (3) specialty producers of more expensive products (e.g., A-Co’s autos);
and (4) producers of capital goods for industries, governments, and very wealthy
people—goods that most employees, neighbors, and welfare recipients are not
likely to purchase (e.g., airplane manufacturers). There is reason to believe that
with cooperative planning among all four types of major corporations, and some
government assistance, a sufficient amount of free-riding can be effectively
reduced to render ownership-broadening financing a competitive alternative to
conventional financing for many publicly traded companies. 15
The free-riding for all of the foregoing producer types would be mitigated by
any tax credits (not subject to free-riding) given to ownership-broadening
corporations whose dividends on inclusive capitalism shares yield increased
government tax revenues and reduced welfare payments. A direct mitigating
benefit (not subject to free-riding) would result (1) from motivation, allegiance,
and gratitude that would likely engender among employees from the ability to
acquire dividend-paying shares of stock with non-recourse credit on the strength
of their employer-company’s earning capacity and (2) from the goodwill that
might be engendered from the public toward corporations willing to broaden
their share ownership by way of the ownership-broadening trusts. The free-riding
would also be somewhat mitigated by the encapitalization of customers in
proportion to their patronage of the goods and services produced by the
participating corporation, with dividends paid to the customers in the form of
credits against future purchases. Such ownership-broadening might be reasonably
expected to attract customers from competing producers that do not offer such
inclusive benefits. 16 The free-riding would also be mitigated in company towns
and city neighborhoods in which the greater wealth of “neighbor” residents
results in benefits to the ownership-broadening participating corporations such
as: (1) lower property and/or other local tax rates; (2) improved neighborhoods,
schools, and hiring conditions; and (3) lower crime and insurance rates.
Another way of mitigating free-riding might be by way of cooperative
coordination among “complementary producers.” For example, because
“frequent flier” miles earned on one airline become more valuable when they can
be used to travel to destinations not served by that airline, cooperating airlines
have negotiated formulae for apportioning the benefits and costs of sharing
patronage. 17 Similar incentives for cooperation exist economy-wide among the
complementary producers of food, clothing, shelter, health care, transportation,
communication, entertainment, and other goods and services that poor and
middle-class people would purchase more of if they had the capital-earningcapacity to do so. The expected benefits of an economy characterized by growing
15. Robert Ashford, Beyond Austerity and Stimulus: Democratizing Capital Acquisition with the
Earnings of Capital as a Means to Sustainable Growth, 36 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 179, 200–01 (2014).
16. For example, if Walmart were to encapitalize its employees, customers, and neighbors, it might
attract customers from its competitors that declined to do so.
17. Ashford, supra note 15, at 201 n.12.
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production-based consumer demand, tax credits, reduced welfare-dependence
and tax rates become greater as the ownership-broadening approach becomes
more widely understood and implemented in a coordinated fashion. If the
principle of binary economic growth is taught and given credence, then it would
seem that many major corporations would benefit from its widespread
implementation; and it would be in their rational interest to promote coordinated
implementation. No major economy is without trade and business associations
that regularly meet, plan, lobby, and act in concert to improve the business
climate for their profit-seeking activities. Through existing channels of
communication, A-Co may negotiate similar arrangements with the
complementary producers mentioned above.
The most difficult cooperative challenge exists with respect to the type-four
producers like airplane manufacturers. Except for the gains from tax benefits and
encapitalizing employees, such producers will not be substantially aided by the
techniques discussed above. However, an additional anti-free-riding technique
may be employed to aid the type-four producers and the other three: Without any
change in state or federal law, corporations have wide latitude in specifying the
terms of the shares they issue. Thus, in addition to the full return features
discussed above, ownership-broadening corporations could issue shares subject
to the following terms: (1) the full return dividends will be paid in cash to satisfy
the obligations of the share acquisition debt provided by the lender; (2) thereafter
such dividends will be paid to the ownership-broadening trust in the form of
transferable credits usable to purchase products of the issuing corporation or its
designate(s); (3) at the election of the beneficiaries, (a) transferable certificates
for the credits will be issued to the beneficiaries who could sell them in private or
government-sponsored exchanges or (b) acting as a fiduciary for the
beneficiaries, the trust would use best efforts to sell those credits for cash to
would-be customers of the issuing corporations or its designates. The producerissuers, their designates, and their beneficiaries could together receive the benefit
of ownership-broadening reduced by some negotiated discount. In this way, the
beneficiaries may receive less than the cash value of the increased demand they
bring to the table, but they will have acquired an ongoing share of the full return
of corporate capital with no personal cash investment and no risk of investment
failure.
1. Binary Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability
An in-depth consideration of the synergistic relationship between inclusive
capitalism and environmental sustainability is beyond the scope of this article. A
few observations identify important points to consider:
(1)
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(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

But it will also make greener technologies and environmental
preservation more affordable, environmental regulation more
politically feasible, and voluntary population control more likely.
The long-term solution to environmental sustainability generally
requires technological advances to produce affordable greener
technologies. If the inclusive capitalism approach advanced in this
article is focused on financing the creation of inherently sustainable
goods and services, the capital income received from these
investments could help create significant consumer demand for these
new greener products/services.
Systemically, such technological advance which generally reduces
labor content per unit of production and, therefore, requires greater
need for (1) more pay for less work, (2) redistributed income, and/or
(3) broadening capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.
Environmental sustainability requires sustainable long-run earning
capacity (which is more characteristic of the capital earning capacity
of a diversified portfolio of Russell-3000 corporations than wages or
individual welfare redistribution).18

C. Greater Growth Without Redistribution
According to the law of private property and the principles of “free markets,”
existing ownership does not include the absolute right to acquire additional
ownership, but only the right to compete for additional capital ownership
acquisition via voluntary exchanges. 19 When considering the various offers set
forth above, A-Co’s fiduciaries would be duty-bound to select the most wealthmaximizing (i.e., competitive) alternative. If A-Co were to select Warren’s offer,
the other offerors could not complain of a redistribution of any of their property
rights. A-Co would properly inform disappointed offerors that they simply did
not make the most competitive offer. The same would be true if A-Co chose
TIAA-Cref’s ownership-broadening as the most competitive offer.
If a particular corporate capital acquisition were deemed to be
“extraordinary,” governing corporate law usually requires shareholder
approval. 20 If an ownership-broadening transaction approved by A-Co’s directors
18. See Ralph P. Hall, Robert Ashford, Nicholas A. Ashford, & Johan Arango-Quiroga, Universal Basic
Income and Inclusive Capitalism: Consequences for Sustainability, 11 SUSTAINABILITY no. 4481, at 1 (2019).
This article explores two related issues relevant to universal basic income and environmental sustainability that
are rarely discussed: (1) The need to harmonize environmental sustainability requirements with the need for
sustainable of income for poor people and (2) the importance of including the principles of Inclusive Capitalism
to supplement labor and redistributed income needed for ecological and economic sustainability. See also
Robert Ashford, Unutilized Productive Capacity, Binary Economics and the Case for Broadening Capital
Ownership, 10 ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MKTS. 11, 40 (2015) [hereinafter Ashford, Unutilized Productive
Capacity].
19. Ashford, Unutilized Productive Capacity, supra note 17, at 42.
20. Robert Ashford, Why Working But Poor? The Need for Inclusive Capitalism, 49 AKRON L. REV. 507,
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is deemed extraordinary, shareholder approval sometimes requires a majority or
supermajority of the shares voted. If shareholder approval is required to approve
a corporate transaction, shareholders can vote their selfish or altruistic
preferences (including for alternatives that do not necessarily maximize corporate
wealth), 21 but all shareholders would be required to abide by the required
majority shareholder vote if required and by the decision of the directors if not
required.
Thus, binary economic growth does not require redistribution. Having been
taught that there is an additional plausible principle relevant to the analysis of
per-capita growth, neoclassical efficiency, and fuller employment, market
participants are free to include or disregard it in determining their economic
behavior. All transactions faithful to the principles of inclusive capitalism are
voluntary. The principles of inclusive capitalism merely reveal plausible ways to
render more equal and competitive the opportunities and benefits of capital
acquisition that are (1) well-supported and promoted by government maintained
and protected financial and physical infrastructure, and (2) routinely employed to
facilitate capital acquisition for the benefit of a small percentage of people
primarily in proportion to their existing wealth, but (3) presently not open as a
practical matter to most people. This deeper understanding of capitalism will
enable market participants to price the value of broadening capital acquisition.
Thus, neither A-Co’s existing shareholders nor other would-be purchasers
may properly complain of redistribution if A-Co’s board properly determined
that the ownership-broadening sale to the constituency trust was the most
competitive alternative. Real redistributions do occur when corporate shares are
sold in contravention of specific property or contractual rights, or for less than
fair value, but otherwise, a sale of corporate shares to non-shareholders to serve a
wealth-enhancing corporate purpose violates no rights of existing shareholders.
Accordingly, when duly approved by the governing corporate process, the
promised benefits of ownership-broadening capital acquisitions for poor and
middle-class people and the resultant binary economic growth, are not achieved
by taking anything away from others or by violating any existing property or
contractual rights. All shares acquired by the constituency trusts for the
530 (2016).
21. Many existing shareholders are charitable, institutional investors like the Ford Foundation, which
broadly advertises that it is dedicated to “eliminating inequality in all of its forms.” Such foundations as well as
some wealthy individuals might prefer the ownership-broadening alternative based on the expectation of
benefits not likely to be well-reflected in market prices. See Robert Ashford, Why Working but Poor? The Need
for Inclusive Capitalism, 45 U. AKRON L. REV. 507, 537 n.56 (2016). See generally Challenging Inequality,
FORD FOUND. (last visited July 16, 2021), https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying “five underlying drivers of inequality—common
factors that, worldwide, contribute to inequality’s many manifestations”). This Ford Foundation analysis of
“underlying drivers of inequality” apparently has yet to identify the great inequality that results from denying
poor and middleclass people competitive access to the same legislation-dependent institutions of corporate
finance that enable richer people to routinely acquire capital acquisition with its future earnings roughly in
proportion to their existing wealth even as they sleep.
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beneficiaries are fully paid for at fair market value by the earnings of the capital
acquired. Dividend income earned by inclusive capitalism shares (used either to
repay the share acquisition loan that was made to the constituency trust or to
provide capital income to the beneficiaries) will not be paid unless all antecedent
costs and prior claims are paid. The earnings received by the beneficiaries are
earnings of their shares; they are not the redistributed earnings of others.
1. Government Facilitative Policies
The basic logic underlying the benefits of inclusive capitalism that seemingly
flow from ownership-broadening financing springs from the confluence of: (1)
the principles of inclusive capitalism; (2) the legislated default advantages of the
default corporate infrastructure; (3) widely accepted principles of finance; (4) the
corporate-wealth-maximizing duties of corporate fiduciaries; and (5) the
(whether or not enlightened) self-interest of investors. Depending on the
magnitude of binary economic growth, these principles alone might sufficiently
incentivize substantial, profitable, ownership-broadening capital acquisition with
the earnings of capital. Nevertheless, to facilitate such capital acquisition, several
government actions would be helpful and desirable.
First, the foremost facilitative government action would be to eliminate the
corporate tax on corporate income paid to the ownership-broadening trusts to
enable the trustees first to repay the share acquisition loan obligations and then
pay dividends to beneficiaries. This tax relief can be wholly justified on the
grounds of both economics and justice. Because the corporations have no use of
the income that it passes on to the trustees, there is no reason to tax it on the
corporate level. Moreover, taxing that corporate income would impede the
repayment of the acquisition debt and reduce the growing capital income paid to
the beneficiaries, which is precisely the economic impetus for the benefits
outlined above.
It is also noteworthy that there are many “second-round ways” that existing
owners routinely receive access to the pre-tax (untaxed) earnings of capital by
way of investment tax credits, deductions for research and development,
depreciation (often accelerated), offshore (usually capital) income, executive
compensation, and other strategies for reducing taxable corporate income. These
“second-round” ways greatly assist existing shareholders in acquiring additional
capital with pre-tax corporate revenues. They benefit people by way of capital
ownership once they have acquired capital but exclude people who presently
have no competitive access to the “first round” of capital acquisition with the
earnings of capital that would enable them to become owners. These secondround ways provide substantial benefits largely in proportion to existing wealth.
These many ways provide little or no direct benefit to people with little or no
capital ownership. Taxing the corporate income on shares acquired by
ownership-broadening financing would not only reduce competitive access of
poor and middle-class people to the “first round” of pre-tax capital acquisition
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with the earnings of capital, but would also perpetuate the denial of the secondround benefits and thereby would have the effect of increasing the severe
disparity that results from denying poor and middle-class people the competitive
economic opportunity to acquire capital with the earnings of capital that richer
people routinely enjoy.
Second, to help diversify the investment risk of ownership-broadening
beneficiaries, the trustees could be allowed to diversify the investment risk of
their beneficiaries by transferring some of the shares to a “mutualized” account in
which beneficiaries from multiple ownership-broadening employers would own a
diversified portfolio of such transferred shares.
Third, to facilitate the availability and reduce the cost of private capital credit
insurance, the government might establish a national ownership-broadening
capital credit reinsurance entity modeled after the Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”) home loan reinsurance program.
Fourth, to reduce the cost of credit for ownership-broadening financing, a
nation’s central bank might monetize ownership-broadening loans until they are
retired.22
To benefit from the advantages of government reinsurance and monetization,
qualified inclusive capitalism financing might be restricted to the economic
basics (the essential needs such as food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education,
and energy) and restrictions might also be based on ecological concerns.
Moreover, as with any government-facilitated program that extends
opportunity to people, eligibility and antidiscrimination rules for determining
beneficiary participation would be needed. Likewise, rules governing the
qualification and duties of ownership-broadening trustees, lenders, and capital
credit insurers would be seemingly desirable.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has advanced the following plausible principle of fuller
employment and per capita growth that: (1) is consistent with widely shared
understanding that real corporate capital investment is always forward looking;
(2) requires no more than elementary school mathematics to comprehend, and (3)

22. An in-depth discussion of monetization is beyond the scope of this chapter. With a default real
growth rate of 2% for the US economy, to avoid deflation and too much inflation, the Federal Reserve may
adjust the money supply to produce a mild 2% inflation rate by purchasing (monetizing) US government bonds
through its Open Market Committee, thereby adding to the money supply. It could reduce that monetization (of
past government spending) and instead monetize capital ownership-broadening bank loans. This practice would
liberate such financing from the past financial saving representing the value of antecedent work of labor and
capital, and would likely reduce the financial cost of such finance to an effective interest rate in the range of
somewhat below and slightly above prime. For a description of the financial and economic aspect of central
bank monetization of ownership-broadening financing. See Ashford, supra note 12, at 202–03, and Robert
Ashford, Unutilized Productive Capacity, Binary Economics and the Case for Broadening Capital Ownership,
10 ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MKTS. 11, 35 (2015).
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is found nowhere in the widely shared literature on the history of economic
thought.
A broader distribution of capital acquisition with the future earnings of
capital creates the rational expectation of a broader distribution of
discretionary capital income in future years (to people with a higher
propensity to consume) and, therefore, greater incentive to employ more
labor and capital in earlier years.
A growing number of economists, academics in other disciplines, and
members of the public have come to appreciate its foundational significance in
that it:
reveals how business corporations may voluntarily choose to broaden
their share ownership to include poor and middle-class people, enhance
the earning capacity of those people, improve corporate profitability as
well as shareholder wealth, and lay the structural economic foundation
for sustainable growth. 23
Thus, it provides entry into the board rooms of the largest, credit-worthy,
publicly traded corporations by poor and middle-class people represented by
sophisticated, well-capitalized financial fiduciaries (that presently represent
people and entities primarily in proportion to their existing wealth). Significantly,
the principle provides this entry not as a matter of charity and corporate social
responsibility but as a matter of competitive right.
Consistent with the fiduciary duties prescribed by existing corporate law, this
principle can be used by corporate fiduciaries in particular instances to enhance
corporate wealth and share value for existing shareholders by simultaneously
enhancing the wealth of employees, customers, neighbors, and welfare recipients.
Moreover, because the general applicability of this principle indicates that any
corporate capital acquisition that can be financed with money borrowed directly
by the corporation may be financed more profitably (to the corporation, preexisting shareholders, and its “newly encapitalized stakeholder-shareholders”) by
way of ownership-broadening real capital acquisition financing, the principle
suggests that corporate fiduciaries have a due-diligence obligation to explore the
practical feasibility of pursuing the ownership-broadening financing alternative
as a part of their ongoing, long-term capital acquisition planning.
Likewise, if (as discussed above) facilitative federal and state legislation
might be helpful to (1) mitigate impediments to profitable ownership-broadening
financing (such as the free-rider problem), (2) enhance investment diversification
23.
Letter
from
Economists
to
Professor
Robert
Ashford
(Apr.
14,
2021),
http://law.syr.edu/uploads/docs/deans-faculty/Ashford_Economist_Letter_in_Support_of_Inclusive_Capitalism041421.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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for the newly encapitalized stakeholder-shareholders, and/or (3) reduce the cost
of capital credit insurance, reinsurance, and interest, then corporate fiduciaries
would seemingly be obligated to work through their ongoing corporate lobbying
programs and through existing trade associations to persuade governments to
enact facilitative measures that would extend the legislated wealth-enhancing
opportunities of corporate finance (generally enjoyed as a practical matter to no
more than 10% of the people primarily in proportion to their existing wealth) to
all people.
Should the opportunity to acquire shareholder interests in corporate capital
with the future earnings of corporate capital made possible by the legislated
corporate infrastructure be limited to existing shareholders primarily in
proportion to their existing wealth or extended to all people in amounts not
limited to their (generally, meager or negative) existing wealth? This question is
but one of a set of questions explored under the broader question posed by this
symposium: For Whose Benefit the Public Corporation? All of these questions
are simultaneously economic, financial, legal/jurisprudential, social policy,
moral, and political questions. If resolved by legislation, a majority of the people
or at least their representatives will decide. If resolved by case law, the judges
will decide. If left to the people, the market participants will decide.
In any case, the decision should be fully informed. The answers to the
questions raised in this symposium depend significantly on the economic
understanding of per-capita growth, efficiency, and fuller employment. The
“received wisdom” on these subjects is widely taught. The fuller principles of
inclusive capitalism are not. Before informed answers to these questions can be
made (whether by legislation, caselaw, or market participants), the principles of
inclusive capitalism must also be widely taught in higher and legal education. If
widely taught along with the “received wisdom” regarding these subjects, and
given credence, this principle will likely change the economic behavior of market
participants and broaden the distribution of financial incentives, economic
opportunities, and capital wealth. However, the principles of inclusive capitalism
will not be widely taught in colleges and universities until teachers and
administrators act responsibly to make it happen.
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